The Supreme Court of Canada yesterday restored the deportation against a street racer found guilty of manslaughter, who had argued that he should be allowed to remain in Canada based on "humanitarian and compassionate" reasons. His apparently "light" criminal conviction sparked outrage in British Columbia at the time.
Here is a summary of the decision. For those interested in the full text, it can be found at:
http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/cgi-bin/print.pl?referer=http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2009/2009scc12/2009scc12.html
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache,* Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
on appeal from the federal court of appeal
K, a citizen of India, immigrated to Canada with his family in 1996, at the age of 14. In 2002, he was found guilty of criminal negligence causing death and received a conditional sentence of two years less a day. A valid removal order was issued to return him to India.
K appealed the order, but the majority of the Immigration Appeal Division (“IAD”) of the Immigration and Refugee Board, after considering the Ribic factors and the evidence, denied “special relief” on humanitarian and compassionate grounds pursuant to s. 67(1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”). A majority of the Federal Court of Appeal applied a “reasonableness” simpliciter standard and set aside the IAD decision. It found that the majority of the IAD had some kind of fixation with the fact that the offence was related to street‑racing. On the issue of the “possibility of rehabilitation”, the majority of the IAD merely acknowledged the findings of the criminal courts in that regard, which were favourable to K, and did not explain why it came to the contrary conclusion. In the end, that court concluded that the majority of the IAD had acted unreasonably in denying relief.
Held (Fish J. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Abella and Charron JJ.: This Court’s decision in Dunsmuir, which was released after the decisions of the lower courts in this case, recognized that, with or without a privative clause, a measure of deference has come to be accepted as appropriate where a particular decision has been allocated to administrative decision makers in matters that relate to their special role, function and expertise. A measure of deference is appropriate whether or not the court has been given the advantage of a statutory direction, explicit or by necessary implication. These general principles of judicial review are not ousted by s. 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act which deals essentially with grounds of review of administrative action, not standards of review. [25]
A legislature has the power to specify a standard of review if it manifests a clear intention to do so. However, where the legislative language permits, the court (a) will not interpret grounds of review as standards of review, (b) will apply Dunsmuir principles to determine the appropriate approach to judicial review in a particular situation, and (c) will presume the existence of a discretion to grant or withhold relief based in part on Dunsmuir including a restrained approach to judicial intervention in administrative matters. [51]
Resort to the flexibility of the general principle of judicial review is all the more essential in the case of a provision like s. 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act which is not limited to particular issues before a particular adjudicative tribunal but covers the full galaxy of federal decision makers who operate in different decision‑making environments under different statutes with distinct grants of decision‑making powers. [28][33]
The language of s. 18.1 generally sets out threshold grounds which permit but do not require the court to grant relief. Despite a difference in the meaning of the English and French versions in the relevant language of s. 18.1(4), the provision should be interpreted to permit a court to exercise its discretion in matters of remedy depending on the court’s appreciation of the respective roles of the courts and the administration as well as the circumstances of each case. The discretion must be exercised judicially, but the appropriate judicial basis for its exercise includes the general principles dealt with in Dunsmuir. [36]
Dunsmuir establishes that there are now only two standards of review: correctness and reasonableness. No authority was cited suggesting that a “correctness” standard of review is appropriate for IAD decisions under s. 67(1)(c) of the IRPA, and the relevant factors in a standard of review inquiry point to a reasonableness standard. These factors include: (1) the presence of a privative clause; (2) the purpose of the IAD as determined by its enabling legislation — the IAD determines a wide range of appeals under the IRPA and its decisions are reviewable only if the Federal Court grants leave to commence judicial review; (3) the nature of the question at issue before the IAD — Parliament has provided in s. 67(1)(c) a power to grant exceptional relief and this provision calls for a fact‑dependent and policy‑driven assessment by the IAD itself; and (4) the expertise of the IAD dealing with immigration policy. These factors must be considered as a whole, bearing in mind that not all factors will necessarily be relevant for every single case. [53‑54][56‑57]
Where, as here, the reasonableness standard applies, it requires deference. Reviewing courts ought not to reweigh the evidence or substitute their own appreciation of the appropriate solution, but must rather determine if the outcome falls within a range of reasonable outcomes. In this case, the question whether K had established “sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations” to warrant relief from his removal order was a decision which Parliament confided to the IAD, not to the courts. [4][59]
The IAD reasons, both the majority and dissent, disclose with clarity the considerations in support of both points of view, and the reasons for the disagreement as to outcome. At the factual level, the IAD divided in large part over differing interpretations of K’s expression of remorse. This is the sort of factual dispute which should be resolved by the IAD not the courts. The majority considered each of the Ribic factors, reviewed the evidence and decided that, in the circumstances of this case, discretionary relief should be refused. While the findings of the criminal courts on the seriousness of the offence and possibility of rehabilitation (the first and second of the Ribic factors), were properly noted, the IAD had a mandate different from that of the criminal courts. The issue before it was not the potential for rehabilitation for purposes of sentencing, but rather whether the prospects for rehabilitation were such that, alone or in combination with other relevant factors, they warranted special discretionary relief from a valid removal order. The IAD was required to reach its own conclusions based on its own appreciation of the evidence and it did so. [64‑66]
In light of the deference properly owed to the IAD under s. 67(1)(c) of the IRPA there was no proper basis for the Federal Court of Appeal to interfere with the IAD decision to refuse special relief in this case. It cannot be said that this decision fell outside the range of reasonable outcomes. [60][67]
Per Rothstein J.: Where a legislature has expressly or impliedly provided for standards of review, courts must follow that legislative intent, subject to any constitutional challenge. With respect to s. 18.1(4) of the Federal Courts Act, the language of para. (d) makes clear that findings of fact are to be reviewed on a highly deferential standard. Courts are only to interfere with a decision based on erroneous findings of fact where the federal board, commission or other tribunal’s factual finding was “made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it”. By contrast with para. (d), there is no suggestion that courts should defer in reviewing a question that raises any of the other criteria in s. 18.1(4). Where Parliament intended a deferential standard of review in s. 18.1(4), it used clear and unambiguous language, as it has in para. (d) regarding facts. The necessary implication is that where Parliament did not provide for deferential review, it intended the reviewing court to apply a correctness standard as it does in the regular appellate context. [70] [72] [113] [117]
While recourse to the common law is appropriate where Parliament has employed common law terms or principles without sufficiently defining them, it is not appropriate where the legislative scheme or provisions expressly or implicitly ousts the relevant common law analysis as is the case with s. 18.1(4) of the Federal Courts Act. Courts must give effect to the legislature’s words and cannot superimpose on them a duplicative common law analysis. The Dunsmuir standard of review should be confined to cases in which there is a strong privative clause. Excepting such cases, it does not apply to s. 18.1(4). The application of Dunsmuir outside the strong privative clause context marks a departure from the conceptual and jurisprudential origins of the standard of review analysis. [70] [74] [106] [136]
The deference approach emerged as a means of reconciling Parliament’s intent to immunize certain administrative decisions from review with the supervisory role of courts in a rule of law system. The creation of expert administrative decision makers evidenced a legislative intent to displace or bypass the courts as primary adjudicators in a number of areas, but it was only with the enactment of privative clauses, which marked the area of tribunal expertise that the legislature was satisfied warranted deference, that a legislature indicated an intent to oust, or at the very least restrict, the court’s review role. Whereas tribunal expertise was a compelling rationale for imposing a privative clause, it was not a free‑standing basis for deference. The approach of judicially imputing expertise which followed, even on questions of law, was a departure from earlier jurisprudence that relied on privative clauses as the manifest signal of the legislature’s recognition of relative tribunal expertise. [79][82‑84][87]
There is no dispute that reviewing courts, whether in the appellate or judicial review contexts, should show deference to lower courts and administrative decision makers on questions of fact and on questions involving mixed fact and law, where a legal issue cannot be extricated from a factual or policy finding. However, where a legal issue can be extricated from a factual or policy inquiry, it is inappropriate to presume deference where Parliament has not indicated this via a privative clause. It is not for the court to impute tribunal expertise on legal questions absent a privative clause and, in doing so, assume the role of the legislature to determine when deference is or is not owed. Recognizing expertise as a free‑standing basis for deference on questions that reviewing courts are normally considered to be expert on departs from the search for legislative intent that governs this area. [89] [90] [91] [93]
Concerns regarding the rigidity of the legislated standards are misplaced. A review of the Federal Courts Act makes clear that the focus of the analysis should be on the nature of the question under review and not on the type of administrative decision maker. Even given this legislative focus on the nature of question under review, not all administrative decision makers will be subject to the same standards of review. Where a decision maker’s enabling statute purports to preclude judicial review on some or all questions through a privative clause, deference will apply and a Dunsmuir standard of review analysis will be conducted. [109‑110]
Section 18.1(4) confers on the Federal Courts the discretion to grant or deny relief in judicial review. The remedial discretion in s. 18.1(4) goes to the question of withholding relief, not the review itself. The traditional common law discretion to refuse relief on judicial review concerns the parties’ conduct, any undue delay and the existence of alternative remedies which is wholly distinct from the common law of standard of review analysis. Reliance upon this discretion contained in s. 18.1(4) to support the view that it opens the door to the Dunsmuir standard of review analysis is inappropriate. [131] [135] [136]
The IAD’s decision not to grant relief in this case should be upheld. The application of the Ribic factors to the case before it and its exercise of discretion is fact‑based. The IAD’s factual findings were not perverse or capricious and were not made without regard to the evidence. [137]
Per Deschamps J.: There is agreement with Rothstein J. that since s. 18.1(4) of the Federal Courts Act sets legislated standards of review, those standards oust the common law. [138]
Per Fish J. (dissenting): The standard of review applicable is "reasonableness", and the IAD’s decision does not survive judicial scrutiny under that standard. The IAD’s task was to look to "all the circumstances of the case" in order to determine whether "sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations" existed to warrant relief from a removal order. The IAD placed the greatest weight on three factors: K’s remorse, rehabilitation, and likelihood of reoffence. Despite abundant evidence that K was extremely unlikely to reoffend and had taken responsibility for his actions, the IAD focussed on a single fact — K’s denial that he was “street racing” — and based its refusal to grant relief largely on that fact alone. While K’s denial may well evidence some “lack of insight”, it cannot be said to contradict — still less to outweigh, on a balance of probabilities — all of the evidence in his favour on the issues of remorse, rehabilitation and likelihood of reoffence. The IAD’s cursory treatment of the sentencing judge’s favourable findings on remorse and the risk of recidivism are particularly troubling. While a criminal court’s findings are not necessarily binding upon an administrative tribunal with a distinct statutory purpose and a different evidentiary record, it was incumbent upon the IAD to consider those findings and to explain the basis of its disagreement with the sentencing judge’s decision. K’s denial of street racing is, at best, of little probative significance in determining his remorse, rehabilitation and likelihood of reoffence. The IAD’s conclusion that there was "insufficient evidence" upon which a determination could be made that K does not represent a risk to the public is not only incorrect, but unreasonable. Decisions of the IAD are entitled to deference, but deference ends where unreasonableness begins. [139‑40] [145] [147] [149‑151] [153‑154] [160]